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The colonial mother protects her child from itself, from its ego, and 
from its physiology, its biology, and its own unhappiness which is its 
very essence. 
It is not enough to try to get back to the people in that past out of 
which they have already emerged; rather we must join them in that 
fluctuating movement which they are just giving a shape to, and 
which, as soon as it has started, will be the signal for everything to be 
called in question. Let there be no mistake about it; it is to this zone of 
occult instability where the people dwell that we must come. 
FANON, The Wretched of the Earth 
I N C O N T E M P O R A R Y C R I T I C A L and theoretical discourses, the 
postmodern and the postcolonial may share certain similar man-
ifestations of forms, themes, and concerns, yet the problematic 
relation between the postmodern and the postcolonial may be 
fundamentally indeterminate and ambiguous. It is not a matter, 
as L i n d a Hutcheon points out, of "the post-colonial becoming the 
postmodern" (151). N o r is it simply a matter of the postmodern 
becoming the postcolonial. For the postmodern may be seen as 
indicative of the end of Euro-American cultural domination, but 
it can also be taken as a sign of the postcolonial condit ion, 
symptomatic of another form of continuing Western hegemony, 
if now persisting under new forms of cultural imperialism. 
A r i f D i r l i k has offered an analytical definition of the term 
"postcolonial," which encompasses three prominent uses: 
(a) as a literal description of conditions in formerly colonial soci-
eties, in which case the term has concrete referents, as in postcolonial 
societies or postcolonial intellectuals; (b) as a description of a global 
condition after the period of colonialism, in which case the usage is 
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somewhat more abstract and less concrete in reference, comparable 
in its vagueness to the earlier term Third World, for which it is 
intended as a substitute; and (c) as a description of a discourse on the 
above-mentioned conditions that is informed by the epistemological 
and psychic orientations that are products of those conditions. 
Since C h i n a was never strictly a colony of any Western empire, 
only the second and third of the above meanings or usages seem 
to apply to the Chinese situation. Yet Chinese intellectuals' lack 
of enthusiasm or response with regard to the notion of the 
"postcolonial" or "postcoloniality," or for that matter Edward 
Said's concept of Orientalism, though understandable in view of 
the peculiarity of modern Chinese history, may be puzzl ing if not 
disquieting. O n e of the main reasons for the apparent neglect of 
Western theoretical discourses on the postcolonial or Orientalist 
other, amid all the frenzied assimilation and appropriation of the 
latest theories from the West, is perhaps the fact that "moderniza-
tion," whatever this term may mean, is still perceived to be the 
overarching project whose urgency has priority over the question 
of national identity or "postcolonial" subjectivity. The fear may 
be that a regressive nationalistic xenophobia or conservative 
political backlash in the wake of any heightening of "post-
colonial" self-consciousness may yet again tr iumph over and 
jeopardize the project of modernization. 
In the background of such anxiety, there may lurk a strong 
desire for political pathos and cultural allegory, for a synchronic 
globalism, which may be seen as complicitous with allegorical 
needs of the dominant metropolitan centre. This is of course the 
familiar narrative of First World postmodemity, which by now has 
become the putative ideal to be pursued by the T h i r d World: the 
myth of the dominant West as centre is reiterated and reinforced, 
thus once again displacing the T h i r d World, together with its 
traditions and histories, to the periphery. T h e T h i r d World seems 
always caught in the gap between the emulation of the West and 
its own burden of tradition. The constitutive inferiority complex 
seems hardly assuaged by the desire to leap forward to the future 
or to catch up with the West. The intrusion of the West into a 
T h i r d World culture should thus not be taken merely as a conflict 
between cultures or a clash of cultural values, since i n reality the 
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impact or shock of the West conceals the one-way nature of this 
encounter. 
Al though C h i n a was never subjugated to any total colonization 
by any Western power, C h i n a was often characterized as a "semi-
feudal and semi-colonial" society i n the first half of the century; 
in Mao Tse-tung's oft-quoted formulation, the task of the Chi-
nese revolution was to overthrow "the three great mountains of 
imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism." Since the 
ig6os, following M a o Tse-tung's reformulation of the "Three 
Worlds" theory, Chinese intellectuals have tended to see their 
country as belonging to the T h i r d World, as a "developing" 
country. With in the last few years, there has been a slow response 
to the question of "Orientalism," particularly that formulated 
by Edward Said. However, it seems that it is the notion of 
the "postmodern" that has most engaged the attention of Chi-
nese intellectuals i n recent years. While the fascination with 
postmodernism or postmodemity betrays a certain "historicist 
compulsion" subscribing to the master narrative of "progressive 
ideology" (Derrida 472), "it is the fairly uncertain feeling 
of being 'post,'" as X i a o b i n g Tang observes, "rather than spe-
cifically 'postmodern' that delivers some comfort as well as a 
new space for the imagination." This compulsion amounts to a 
"conflation of a post-revolutionary ethos with postmodernist dis-
course" (Tang, "Residual Modernism" 7), symptomatic of "a 
historic anxiety that is, nevertheless, foreclosed as such" (8). 
"Postmodern," "postcolonial," " T h i r d World," "Orientalism": 
all these labels as applied to the Chinese situation are for var-
ious reasons inadequate and unsatisfactory and in an important 
sense, distortive. Their usefulness as cognitive and critical cate-
gories is doubtful, beyond the l imited heuristic value they may 
have, since they are all fundamentally totalizing and homogeniz-
ing, standardizing disparate historical and cultural experiences 
of very different cultures and societies. The cultural conditions 
that these labels are meant to evoke have become so consensual 
and standardized that "the very world of cultural difference and 
plurality" which they "allegedly [bring] to visibility" is simul-
taneously named and closed off (Connor 9-10). Hence the 
paradox of postmodern "consensus" that "there is no longer any 
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possibility of consensus"; at the same time, "a total and compre-
hensive narrative of a cultural condition in which totality is 
no longer thinkable" accompanies "the authoritative announce-
ments of the disappearance of final authority" (Connor 10). 
Insofar as the postmodern condition is, as Robert Young observes 
of Orientalism, symptomatic of "an internal dislocation within 
Western culture, a culture which consistently fantasizes itself as 
constituting some kind of integral totality, at the same time as 
endlessly deploring its own impending dissolution" ( 139), total-
ity may indeed seem inescapable, since the very demarcation of 
the same by simple opposition to the other would "already be a 
part of a totality encompassing the same and the other" (Lévinas 
38). The point of totality is to articulate and specify the his-
torical determinations that have produced any present cultural 
formation. 
Stephen Slemon has specifically l inked postmodernism to its 
appropriation of the Other(s): "Like modernism, postmoder-
nism needs its (post-) colonial Others in order to constitute or 
to frame its narrative of referential fracture. But it also 
needs to exclude the cultural and political specificity of post-
colonial representations in order to assimilate them to a rig-
orously Euro-American problematic" (14). If postcolonial 
discourses call for a recontextualizing and historicizing of the 
West's own modernity and postmodernity, then this Western 
problematic is precisely what the postcolonial discourse must 
seek to contest and redefine. While postcolonial criticism chal-
lenges the dominance of any particular, relativized narrative (for 
example, Western postmodernism), it also at the same time wants 
to assert a counter-discourse or counter-narrative against the 
West's continuing hegemony. Yet this counter-discourse may also 
be under pressure from the metropolitan centre to satisfy its 
universalizing assimilative impulse; as Bhabha notes, there may 
be a foreclosure of the Other in Western theoretical discourses, 
since it is an "other" culture's "location as the 'closure' of grand 
theories, the demand that, i n analytical terms, it always be the 
'good' object of knowledge, the docile body of difference, that 
reproduces a relation of dominat ion" (31). 
Discursive relations of power and domination are of course 
central to Edward Said's notion of Orientalism. As Aijaz A h m a d 
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notes, there are many difficulties with Said's Orientalism, diffi-
culties of "definition, conception, periodization, theoretical po-
sition and political uncertainty" (186). Said's concern with the 
problem of representation does not yield any conceptual clarity, 
and he is finally unable to decide whether the Orientalist dis-
course is "a system of representations, i n the Foucauldian sense, 
or of misrepresentations, i n the sense of a realist problematic" 
(Ahmad 185-86; see also Bhabha 72). There is also the problem 
of the exact relationship between Orientalism as a discourse and 
colonialism as a historical process. Said is profoundly ambiguous 
about whether Orientalism is the transhistorically constitutive 
element of "the European imagination," or whether colonialism 
itself is a product of the Orientalist discourse (Ahmad 181). 
According to Said, Orientalist discourse is "a form of cultural 
praxis, a system of opportunities for making statements about 
the Orient." This discourse is not necessarily "a misrepresenta-
tion of some Oriental essence," but rather "operates as represen-
tations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in 
a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting" 
(Said, Orientalism 273-74). X i a o m e i C h e n has proposed the 
notion of "Occidentalism" as its Oriental (that is, Chinese) coun-
terpart. As the reverse-image of Orientalism, a similar logic of 
synchronic essentializing is at work i n the discourse of Chinese 
Occidentalism. Occidentalism as "a form of political, cultural 
praxis" no doubt functions strategically within given historical 
contexts. But as an essentializing discourse, Occidentalism is no 
less monolithic and coercive than its much criticized counterpart 
Orientalism. Occidentalism fits obversely into a distorting frame-
work of allegorical displacement as much as Orientalism. It 
would be grossly reductive to consider the question of Chinese 
Occidentalism solely with reference to contemporary Chinese 
politics, within a narrowly circumscribed frame of contemporary 
political topicality. The controversial television series He Shang 
(River Elegy), as a prime example of Chinese Occidentalism, is 
symptomatic of the inherent contradictions of modern Chinese 
history. Its historical revisionism and Utopian projection of desire 
unto an idealized Other or an elsewhere should be seen for what 
they are: as a politically expedient intervention and at the same 
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time an escapism from underlying problems of modern Chinese 
politics and culture. M o d e r n Chinese intellectuals have been 
constituted as " m o d e m " intellectuals by the very discourse of 
Occidentalism which they have constructed. It is both an en-
abling discourse and one of distortion and displacement, in 
short, an ideology. As Ricoeur has argued, such utopianism is "a 
way of fleeing the contradictions and ambiguity both of the use 
of power and the assumption of authority" (17). Inscribed i n the 
U t o p i a n desire of the HeShang phenomenon is the logic of what 
Gregory Jusdanis has termed "belated modernity." In the C h i -
nese projective imitation of the West, there is internalized a 
fundamental structural deficiency i n the very "incompleteness" 
of the modernization project. Utopian future is temporalized as 
the present already realized bv the contemporary West. Jiwei Ci's 
analysis is here compell ing: "The future is at once a temporal and 
a conceptual construct. Where the only urge is to make the self 
like the other, there is no conceptual future but only a temporal 
future, because the temporal future will at best unfold a concep-
tual future that has already been realized, namely, as the present 
of the West. In the meantime, all you can do is to imitate, to make 
yourself like someone else" (253-54). 
Said wants to expose and dismantle the structures of cultural 
domination involved in the duality of "the Occident" and "the 
Orient," but he himself repeats and reinforces such dualistic 
thinking. The relation between the inside (the Occident) and 
the outside (the Orient) remains rigidly polarized. As Young 
points out, what is neglected i n Said's account is any notion of 
"an inner dissension" (140) in the West's construction of an 
Orientalist discourse. As a result, Orientalism as a symptomatic 
representation of "the West's own internal dislocation" is instead 
"misrepresented as an external dualism between East and West" 
(140), "the West's own dislocation from itself is "presented, 
narrativized, as being outside" (139). This description can be 
transposed to apply to the Chinese fantasy about the West. In the 
Chinese construction of an "Occidentalist" discourse, the same 
inside/outside dichotomy is at work: China's own dislocation 
from itself is presented, narrativized and projected as being 
outside, as being an externalized conflict between Chinese tradi-
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don and modern West. The notion of "Chinese essence," pro-
posed bv conservative culturalist apologists since the second half 
of the nineteenth century, became as a result integral, totalistic, 
and at the same time relativistic, merely "traditionalistic," as 
Joseph Levenson notes, "not an absolute conviction" (Levenson, 
Revolution 20). 
The Chinese fabrication of the "Occident," "Occidentalism" 
as a discourse, could be dated back at least to the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The binary oppositions (tradition/ 
modernity, China/West, old/new, inside/outside) have exerted 
their powerful dominance precisely because they have been 
internalized, deliberately or unconsciously. They are not mere 
impositions from the outside, from Western imperial powers. Rev 
Chow has called attention to the imbrication of the issues of 
modernity and modernism in Chinese culture in the pressures 
and processes of Western imperialism, and calls into question 
the facile equation of the "modern" with the "new." Chow-
asks the pertinent question about China's supposed progress 
from cultural backwardness to Western enlightenment: could it 
in fact be seen as "the process whereby all such concepts are 
parochialized as they are confronted with a culture that seems 
persistently subversive of their recognized rhythms of develop-
ment?" {Woman and Chinese Modernity 35-36). As Paul A. Cohen 
argues, the simplistic opposition between tradition/modernitv, 
which posits the two as "mutually exclusive, whollv incompatible 
systems," also owes its power and dominance to the epistemologi-
cai authority exerted by the West, through its theory of moderniz-
ation paradigm. C h i n a was in effect denied any self-generated 
initiative for change and instead needed "for its transformation 
the impact of a 'force from without' " whose carrier was the West 
(81 ). This may be seen as an "Occidentalism" imposed from the 
West. The dichotomy "modernity/tradition" does not acknowl-
edge the necessarily historical and specific character of a given 
culture; indeed the dichotomy itself is imported and internal-
ized. Such a dichotomy is not only emotionally and intellectually 
traumatic; it also elicits sentimental stock responses. 
In a fundamental sense, Chinese intellectuals are still very 
much concerned, as Said says of Arab and Islamic artists and 
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intellectuals, "with modernity itself, still far from exhausted, still a 
major challenge i n a culture dominated by turath (heritage) and 
orthodoxy" (Said, Culture and Imperialism 329). I f i n the West "the 
main thrust of modernism today is hardly aimed at tradition as 
such, but at an instrumental rationality that is seeking to incorpo-
rate even the disruptive forms of its opposition" (Eysteinsson 
241), then Chinese modernism is something different: its main 
thrust is aimed at Chinese tradition. Almost any term can be 
pitted against what is taken as "tradition." In the Chinese con-
text, as X i a o b i n g Tang observes, "modernism as a general label, 
no matter how vague and unspecified, plays the revolutionary 
role of producing new energies and imaginings. In effect, mod-
ernism has been valorized and cherished as the opposite of 
dogmatic traditionalism at the same time that it has been offi-
cially condemned" (Tang, " L u X u n ' s " 1225). 
O n the one hand, Chinese "modernism" is opposed to "tradi-
tion"; on the other, it is also seen as inseparably l inked with 
"Westernization." The "West" as a value is both positive and 
negative. "Westernization" as a label becomes formalistic and 
abstract, often deployed negatively: l iberal intellectuals use it to 
counter against cultural conservatives who insist on "Chinese 
essence" or "national essence"; oppositional intellectuals use it to 
oppose official ideology and to project U t o p i a n desire onto the 
West as the Other; official discourse uses "Westernization" (often 
in the code formulas "spiritual pol lut ion" and "bourgeois liberal-
ism") to contain opposition and consolidate its own legitimation 
in the name of Chinese nationalism or patriotism. It would be no 
exaggeration to say that the history of modern and contempo-
rary C h i n a is a history of discursive and ideological battles waged 
under the sign of the "West." The West (America and Europe) 
has been China's appointed Other: this choice itself bespeaks 
China's subjugation to the dominance of Western power. The 
problematic of Chinese modernity is born out of its confronta-
tion with the West as Other. 
"Modernity," or "postmodernity," while often defined as a pre-
dominantly Western or Euro-American phenomenon, is now 
increasingly seen as dependent u p o n the West's dialectical rela-
tion to the alterity of the non-Western. The colonizer and the 
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colonized are mutually imbricated. D i r l i k suggests that " i f a crisis 
in historical consciousness, with all its implications for national 
and individual identity, is a basic theme of postcoloniality, then 
the First World itself is postcolonial," since "the end of colonial-
ism presents the colonizer as much as the colonized with a 
problem of identity" (337). In postcolonial or postmodern dis-
courses, there must then be an imperative need to articulate self-
reflexively the phenomenon of what has been called global 
capitalism as it affects both the First and T h i r d Worlds. In Fredric 
Jameson's influential view, the postmodern condition "can be 
accounted for in classical Marxist terms, as indices of a new 
and powerful, original, global expansion of capitalism, which 
now specifically penetrates the hitherto precapitalist enclaves of 
T h i r d World agriculture and of First World culture, i n which, in 
other words, capital more definitively secures the colonization of 
Nature and the Unconscious" (Jameson, "Foreword" xiv). How-
ever, the antinomy between the advanced postmodern Western 
world and the " T h i r d World" may finally collapse into the appro-
priation of the Other into the Same, for this antinomy provides 
Jameson with a narrative of the regeneration of the First World by 
the T h i r d World taken as "Nature" and "the unconscious." As 
Mart in E. Gloege forcefully argues, Jameson's rhetoric of post-
modernism makes the " T h i r d Wor ld" cultures into "theoretical 
and abstract ideas": thus the binary opposition between "the 
advanced world" and "the third world" can be rewritten as "the 
advanced world versus Nature and the unconscious," further as 
"the advanced world versus i tself i f the unconscious is also part 
of the advanced world. Jameson's "Emersonian narrative of the 
regeneration of America by Nature" can thus be seen as a "narra-
tive of the regeneration of late capitalism by its own unconscious 
(from within) and by the third world (from without)" (Gloege 
66). 
Jameson argues that under imperialism and colonialism, met-
ropolitan experience "can now no longer be grasped imma-
nently; it no longer has its meaning, its deeper reason for being, 
within itself." The national literature formed on such experience 
"will now henceforth always have something missing about it" 
and there will always be something "which it constitutively lacks, 
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and which can never be made up or made good" (Jameson, 
"Modernism and Imperialism" 51 ). We can transpose Jameson's 
argument to the Chinese case: " the formal contradiction," the 
lack and incompleteness of the Chinese modemitv project (be-
ing peripheral to the Western centre) is precisely what Chinese 
modernity tries to solve. The very content of the national litera-
ture or culture itself "can now no longer be grasped imma-
nently"; it no longer has its meaning solely within itself, but 
only in relation to the metropolitan centre. It is thus deeply 
ironic for Jameson to assert that in the T h i r d World the concept 
of the postmodern seems "to authorize the end of a Eurocentr-
ism now primarily mediated by the U S itself," or "the end of the 
reality of such domination": " O n this view, postmodernism is the 
wedge whereby the older Eurocentric paradigm is broken up, 
and along with it the teleological master narrative of the modern. 
Postmodemity thus comes as something like the declaration of 
independence of hitherto subordinated (third world) cultures" 
(Jameson, "Introduction" 420-21). Jameson speaks as i f post-
modernity is not itself a new teleological master narrative circu-
lated from the metropolitan centre. As Jameson himself admits, 
the term and concept of a "third world postmodernism," en-
abling as it is, might also be "the object of a certain suspicion, as 
yet another possible poisoned gift of a E u r o p e a n / N o r t h Ameri-
can (if no longer exactly Eurocentric) theory" (Jameson, "Intro-
duction" 422). 
If postmodernism can be seen as signifying the end of Euro-
centrism, the end of Eurocentric universal "History," post-
modernism in Jameson's terms, as Young notes, "would then be 
orientalism's dialectical reversal: a state of dis-orientation" 
(1 17). H e notes that "The T h i r d World seems to offer a dia-
lectical opposite to the postmodernism of the First World so that 
both can be transcended in the name of the U t o p i a n future of 
socialism" (114-15). Young has advanced one of the most so-
phisticated accounts of the Hegelian problematic of historical 
consciousness in poststructuralist and post-Marxist theories. Ac-
cording to Young, "Hegel articulates a philosophical structure of 
the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge which 
uncannily simulates the project of nineteenth-century imperial-
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ism; the construction of knowledges which all operate through 
forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other mimics at 
a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of 
the non-European world by the West. Marxism's standing Hegel 
on his head may have reversed his idealism, but it d i d not change 
the mode of operation of a conceptual system which remains 
collusively Eurocentric" (3). This is the "ontological imperial-
ism" of which Lévinas speaks, which is traceable to the roots of 
Western thinking i n ancient Greece and finds its recent expres-
sion in Heidegger (13). Young offers a definition of contempo-
rary Western postmodernism as "European culture's awareness 
that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the 
world," a self-conscious awareness of the West's "historical rela-
tivity" which "also involves the loss of the sense of an absoluteness 
of any Western account of History" (19). Yet, paradoxically, the 
Western account of History is still regarded by many contempo-
rary Chinese intellectuals as the universal model of moderniza-
tion and teleological progress. 
As the Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty points out, "Eu-
rope works as a silent referent in historical knowledge" (343), a 
profound "theoretical condit ion under which historical knowl-
edge is produced in the third world" (344). Especially dominant 
in T h i r d World historical discourses has been Marx's model of 
historical progress from feudalism through capitalism to social-
ism and communism, a "transition narrative" of development, 
modernization and capitalism, within whose problematics are 
written most m o d e m Third-World histories (345). Chakrabarty 
calls for a project of "provincializing 'Europe, ' " a dual recogni-
tion that "Europe's acquisition of the adjective modern for itself is 
a piece of global history of which an integral part is the story of 
European imperial ism" and that Third-World modernizing na-
tionalisms "have been equal partners in the process" (363). O n 
the one hand there is the collapse of grand narratives (Hegelian 
theodicy of European or Western history) ; on the other hand 
there is the postmodern circulation of proliferating images and 
narratives. But it is doubtful whether the Hegel ian master narra-
tive of universal progress has finally lost its dominance. The 
Chinese critic Chen Maiping's argument may be taken as typical 
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of the thinking of many contemporary Chinese intellectuals 
when he argues that the notions of "modernism" and "post-
modernism" cannot be confined to a geographical context, but 
must be defined "only as a historically progressive text" (87). 
This "historically progressive text," in which "modernity" is op-
posed to "tradition," is identified with the "process of moderniza-
t ion" in the West which "was successively completed by means of 
the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Revo-
lutions in England, France, and the US, and finally by means of 
the Industrial Revolution" (88). The influential and dominant 
scheme of evolutionary progress or historical laws, derived from 
Marxism to explain cultural and historical development, stipu-
lates an iron law of necessary development based on economic 
and productive forces of social formation. Chinese intellectuals' 
tacit acceptance of the official programme of "socialist modern-
ization" is in this context meaningful: it subscribes to the uni-
versalizing project of progressive global modernization. Thus 
Chinese modernity has to be re-inserted into history, into the 
history of Western modernity as a universalizing, "civil izing" 
process. Colonial or postcolonial intellectuals, as Frantz Fanon 
observed long ago, caught between two cultures and nation-
alities, tend to "gather together all the historical determining 
factors which have conditioned them and take up a fundamen-
tally 'universal standpoint'" (218). 
The O p i u m War may be seen retrospectively as the historical 
marker of the birth of "modern" China , or of the instauration 
of Chinese modernity (see C i 26; 248-49). C h i n a embarked 
on the path to modernity under the pressure of Western im-
pact, of Western colonialism and imperialism. The modern 
Chinese nation-state was as much a product of colonialist and 
imperialist pressure as an expression of intrinsic nationalist con-
sciousness. As Yü-sheng L i n observes, "Acceptance of Western 
ideas and values was by and large predicated on Chinese nation-
alism, which in turn emerged as a direct response to the chal-
lenge of Western intrusion" (10). Yet the notion of "Western 
influence" cannot explain why Chinese intellectuals of the New 
Culture movement all adopted what L i n terms the "cultural-
intellectualistic approach," because many of these intellectuals, 
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while assimilating certain Western ideas and values, refused to 
accept forms of intellectualism or idealism within the Western 
tradition itself (50). U n d e r pressures of change, Chinese "icono-
clastic nationalism" "transformed the prevailing social Darwin-
ian theory o/change into an ideology for change" (63), which led 
to the "notion of the complete incompatibility of the old and the 
new" and "scorned the past ideas and values not only of Chinese 
tradition but of any tradition" (63n). 
Indigenous culture was thus hypostatized into a homogeneous 
unity which is then pitted against the antinomy of tradit ion/ 
modernity. T h e n the choice must be made between the two. It is 
a forced choice of course, because the indigenous or the native is 
already fractured, split by internal contradictions, dependent 
upon a totality which exceeds its historically sedimented cultural 
formation. If the break with the past is construed as unique, its 
uniqueness must be constantly recapitulated by positing an abso-
lute discontinuity with the past. This is the aporedc conscious-
ness of modernity which has lost its capacity to place itself i n 
history, i n relation to history. The atrophy of historical conscious-
ness may indeed entail the ahistorical projection of desire which 
posits absolute origins and beginnings and may finally result i n 
the projective self-exoneration from historical reflection. The 
negativity of tradition thus constituted i n the historical imagin-
ary is then projected onto what might be called a futural present 
whose own negativity would be transcended through being re-
situated i n a teleology of progress and universalization. 
The modern West as universal value, as universality itself, has 
been internalized deeply i n the collective consciousness of mod-
ern Chinese intellectuals dur ing the May Fourth period and 
after. The West came to be identified with its Enlightenment 
rationality which was seen to endow the West with power and 
wealth. The total iconoclastic rejection of Chinese tradition in 
the name of the Enlightenment spirit can also be seen as the 
indirect result of European colonialism and imperial ism, to the 
extent that Chinese intellectuals forced themselves to assume the 
subject-position of the colonized both i n relation to European 
imperial powers and i n alienating themselves from their cultural 
identity and tradition. T u Wei-ming has described the di lemma 
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faced by the Mav Fourth intellectuals in the following terms, 
"As Confucian humanism (their own value system) became ridi-
culed and the Enlightenment mentality (the value system they 
were determined to import) became instrumentalized, thev 
could neither tap into their own indigenous resources nor take 
seriously what the West could offer" ( 117). This is the story told 
by Joseph Levenson in his Confucian China and Its Modem Fate. 
Chinese intellectuals were forced to choose between the West 
and the Chinese past, that is, between modernity and tradition, 
between the new and the old. The choice of the West caused 
tremendous emotional trauma for many intellectuals, but intel-
lectually they were forced to acknowledge and accept the univer-
sality of Western values. Thus the Chinese past or tradition was 
radically historicized and relativized. Marxism came to fill the 
traumatic gap left by this antagonistic choice because it offered a 
teleological narrative of social development and modes of pro-
duction, which could (re)insert C h i n a into the global narrative 
of progressive transition. 
This di lemma persists in present-day China , where intellec-
tuals have hardly come to a recognition of the double nature of 
the Western Enlightenment legacy. This is partly due to the 
deeply entrenched Marxist belief in dialectics and teleology, 
Marxism's "complicity in the modernization model with its re-
lentless drive toward industrialization, urbanization, and tech-
nological rationalization" (Dallmayr 3). Thus the double task 
facing postcolonial intellectuals today, as Fred Dallmayr urges, is 
"a struggle with and against Hegel (or with Hegel against Hegel) 
and more broadly with and against the enlightenment legacy, 
that is, an endeavor to transgress the triumphalism of reason and 
the self-enthronement of spirit, without abandoning Hegelian 
insights or the demands of enlightened reason" (2). 
One of the main tasks of enlightened reason today would be 
the articulation of cultural and historical determinations and 
sedimentations as they pertain to the question of self-identity. 
Fanon was among the first to observe that the (post)colonial 
subject as the other may be unable to assume the presence of 
the self. Inevitably it is not a problem of finding an "original," 
authentic voice for the self, but one of hybridization. A m o n g 
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present-day postcolonial critics, H o m i Bhabha's concept of cul-
tural "hybridity" has been influential (58). Yet hybridization 
does not dispose of the question of "authenticity" as self-identitv 
and self-recognition. Authenticity can be taken in the sense 
proposed by Thomas Langan as "achieving the fullest possible 
self-understanding and self-control so as to be able to respond to 
the needs and possibilities of the situation" ( 1 1 ) . Authenticity 
should not be conceived merely as anti-colonial resistance, nor 
it cannot, as Chow says, "simply be imagined i n terms of a re-
sistance against the image — that is, after the image has been 
formed — nor in terms of a subjectivity that existed before, be-
neath, inside, or outside the image" ( Writing Diaspora 51 ). It is to 
become aware of the disjunctive temporality of cultural identity. 
.As a parallel to (post)colonial "hybridity," Bhabha proposes 
the notion of "colonial mimicry" as "the representation of a 
difference that is itself a process of disavowal" (86). This is also 
true of the colonized insofar as the colonized reform the self as 
the other, as the image of the other, i n the image of the other. 
Mimicry is thus "the sign of a double articulation" (86) ; it is both 
the appropriation of power and the inappropriable difference. 
O n the one hand, it is necessary "to assert and affirm a denied or 
alienated subjectivity" (Hutcheon 151 ). O n the other hand, we 
should equally realize that the reaffirmation of alienated subjec-
tivity may be a profoundly negative enterprise, because what is to 
be affirmed is precisely a sense of the self as disjunctive, alien-
ated, dislocated, and hybridized. Any emancipatory politics must 
start with the affirmation of self-consciousness, yet necessarily 
with a positive awareness of its alienation. 
Commenting on the work of the Indian Subaltern Studies 
group, Spivak urges that the task of postcolonial criticism is "to 
retrieve the subaltern consciousness as the attempt to undo a 
massive historiographie metalepsis and 'situate' the effect of the 
subject as subaltern." Spivak advocates "a strategic use of positivist 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest" (205). Yet 
the interest need not be merely political, since the subaltern 
identity must of necessity be worked out through the aporias of 
disjunctive temporalities and geographical positions which often 
constitute the totality within which any subaltern identity has 
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come to be, within a regime of "the epistemic violence that 
constituted/effaced a subject that was obliged to cathect (oc-
cupy i n response to a desire) the space of the Imperialists' self-
consolidating other" (209). Lisa Lowe has further developed 
Spivak's insight: "it is possible to constitute specific signifiers of 
otherness, such as Indianness, for the purpose of disrupting the 
discourses that exclude Indians as Other while simultaneously 
revealing the internal contradictions and slippages of 'Indian-
ness' so as to ensure that the signifier Indianness will not be 
reappropriated by the very effort to criticize its use" (198). 
In the Chinese context, Chineseness or Chinese experience inevita-
bly contains within itself historical signs of Western mediation, at 
least on two levels: the direct or indirect coercive pressures, in all 
their material forms, of Western colonialism and imperialism, of 
Western postmodern capitalism, and the mediation of Western 
"theory." Thus "Chinese experience" is not a concept in search of 
pristine authenticity, but one of hybridized identity. O n the one 
hand, "Westernization" has become an acknowledged part of 
modern Chinese history; on the other hand, the negotiation with 
cultural self-identity has yet to be historically articulated. Chi-
neseness as a signifier needs to be situated and substantiated 
within the discursive practices of national and individual identity 
in relation to both "tradition" and "the West," that is, i n relation 
to both the modern Chinese historical imaginary and social and 
cultural fantasy about the experience of otherness. If modern 
Chinese culture is, as Chow claims, "caught between the past as 
culture and the present as realpolitik" (Writing Diaspora 133), 
then what need to be redeemed are "the experiences of uneasy 
translations between cultures, translations that are mediated by 
the possession and lack of power" (141). 
D i r l i k has suggested that "postcoloniality is the condit ion of 
the intelligentsia of global capitalism" and that the question for 
the "global intelligentsia" is not whether one "can (or should) 
return to national loyalties but whether, i n recognition of its own 
class-position i n global capitalism, it can generate a thorough-
going criticism of its own ideology and formulate practices of 
resistance against the system of which it is a product" (356). Said 
similarly advocates the project of rereading the "cultural ar-
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chive," "not univocally but contrapuntally, with a simultaneous 
awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and 
of those other histories against which (and together with which) 
the dominating discourse acts" (Said, Culture 51). The task of 
postcolonial intellectuals would be to reinscribe their political 
and cultural identity and to "rechart and then occupy" their 
subaltern position "self-consciously" {Culture 210). 
Modernism or postmodernism should not be merely equated 
with socioeconomic modernization but must be regarded as the 
mode of cultural consciousness on the part of intellectual elites 
in postcolonial cultures to project the hybridized and disjunctive 
temporalities into the space of global progress defined by the 
West. The historical nature of hybridization is closely related to 
the sedimentation of disjunctive temporalities in the cultural 
unconscious, which simultaneously compels and permits the 
recognition of the Other within the Self. This return of con-
tingent temporality or historicity, in the postmodern as the 
postcolonial, in what Bhabha reformulates as the "postcolonial 
contramodemity" (175), can thus be "revalued as a form of 
anteriority . . . whose causality is effective because it returns to 
displace the present, to make it disjunctive," because it creates 
for "the politics of cultural difference" the space of articulation 
and "the inscription of cultural incommensurability where dif-
ferences cannot be sublated or totalized" (177). The "ante-
riority" is not the primordial or timeless past or tradition which 
may be transcended or simply disposed of; rather it is "a mode of 
'negativity' that makes the enunciatory present of modernity 
disjunctive" (238). "The time-lag of postcolonial modernity 
moves forward, erasing that compliant past tethered to the myth 
of progress" (253). This time-lag "keeps alive the making of the past" 
(254), and functions "to slow down the linear, progressive time 
of modernity to reveal its 'gesture,' its tempi, 'the pauses and 
stresses of the whole performance'" (253). 
Johannes Fabian has pointed out that what are opposed in the 
"tradition/modernity" antagonism are "not the same societies at 
different stages of development, but different societies facing 
each other at the same Time" ( 155). The complex, hybridized, 
nonsynchronic identity of postcolonial cultures is complicated 
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by the synchronic vision of culture in the West, because, in 
K u m k u m Sangari 's analysis, "the synchronic time of the modern 
and of the postmodern in the Wrest is an end product of the 
now discredited linear time of modernity and progress" (160). 
Sangari further points out that the epistemologica! problem is 
itself a historical one: "The double disjunction of a hybrid simul-
taneity and of the economic and ideological deformations of 
neocolonialism is the condition within which the real is per-
ceived" (161). Postmodernist erasure of real differences in an 
ever disseminating, displacing network of pluralist discourses 
may be seen to legitimate a new form of colonization, in that 
postmodernism tacitly legitimizes the erasure of historicity and 
conceals the global power-relations of late capitalism in the form 
of economic, political, and cultural domination and hegemony. 
As Slemon notes, "The universalizing, assimilative impulse that 
carries itself forward in the name of postmodernism" continues 
"a politics of colonialist control" (14). 
Under the signs of postmodernism and global capitalism, the 
problem of hegemonic politics today assumes new forms and 
dimensions. Postcolonial or developing societies are "today chal-
lenged in their self-conception and habitual life-worlds more 
radically than ever before" (Dallmayr 2). As Zygmunt Bauman 
further notes, postmodernitv is apt to be regarded "as the ten-
dency of contemporary culture (without qualifications)," while its 
causes are usually explained as unique to certain advanced soci-
eties, "with no reference to the unique position of such societies 
in global arrangements." Bauman suggests that there is "a dis-
tinct possibility that the advent of postmodernity in one part of 
the world is precisely the effect of such an unique position; both 
the erosion of the universalistic ambitions that part of the world 
entertained in the past, and of the still considerable privilege this 
part enjoys in the world-wide distribution of resources" (Bauman 
59). The dangers of more subtle and pervasive forms of colonial-
ism or neo-colonialism, or what has been called cultural imperi-
alism (see Thompson) must not go unnoticed. As David Spun' 
observes, "To see non-Western peoples as having themselves 
become the standard-bearers of Western culture is in some ways a 
more profound form of colonization," since "the object of appro-
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priation" may be "the very nature of realitv i n the T h i r d World, 
now seen in its potential as an image of the West" (36). 
In contemporary postcolonial and postmodern debates, the 
question of cultural otherness has also often been posed as 
the antinomy of cultural universalism versus cultural relativism, 
an antinomy inherited from the European Enlightenment. But 
both may be excessive, as Tzvetan Todorov warns. "Excessive 
universalism" which erases all difference and specificity, can 
often be just "unconscious ethnocentrism," while "excessive rela-
tivism" denies any shared ground of common humanity (374). 
This is no doubt a salutary warning. Yet the legacy of the Enlight-
enment may also be a paradoxical one, as Terry Eagleton argues, 
in that while the Enlightenment believes in the "abstract univer-
sal right of all to be free, the shared essence or identity of all 
human subjects to be autonomous," "the only point of enjoying 
such universal abstract equality is to discover and live one's own 
particular difference" (30). "Concrete particularity," in today's 
world of proliferating postmodern simulacra, may be difficult to 
achieve. If Western culture has become a "metaculture" whose 
"elements cease to be 'ethnic' and become internationalized as 
intrinsic components of a world shaped by Western develop-
ment" (Mosquera 531), then cultural self-autonomy or resis-
tance under unequal power-relations may remain paradoxical. 
As Immanuel Wallerstein notes, the assertion or reassertion of 
"particular cultural values that have been neglected or dispar-
aged in order to protest against the imposition of the cultural 
values of the strong upon the weaker" would entail the necessity 
on the part of the weaker cultures to prove the validity of the 
(re-)asserted values " in tenus of criteria laid down by the power-
ful" (100). There seems no escaping from the "concept of 
universal values," which is in effect (re)legitimized in the very 
"assertion of some particular culture" (101). 
However, cultural oppositions and polarities are by no means 
rigid and fixed. The universal/particular binarism, like that of 
self/other, must be suspended, without privileging either of the 
two terms, since both are mutually imbricated and constitutive. It 
is thus important, as Zhang Longxi urges, to dismantle the 
"binary opposition of totality and difference," and to adopt a 
30 M I N G X I E 
critical, self-reflexive stance toward both "the traditional West-
ern discourse of a universal human nature" and "contemporary 
Western theory of an irreducible difference" (66). The contem-
porary Chinese desire for recognition in a new global order must 
be seen i n relation to its deference to the standard of "univer-
sality" and to a desire to participate in global culture precisely by 
finding its own voice and identity rooted in history and geogra-
phy. Recognition of one's own historical experience is at the 
same time recognition of spatial and temporal distance. If a 
narrative of cultural identification, in the form of "national 
identity" or "national allegory," is now deemed too restrictive or 
undesirable, then the problem of cultural authenticity needs to 
be reconsidered as one of alterity, in relation both to the Other as 
Self and to the Self as Other. The positive potential of a Chinese 
postmodernist cultural self-consciousness may thus be to subvert 
the essentializing and totalizing allegorization of national iden-
tity, positive or negative. This means that the spatial encounter 
with other cultures is compounded with the ceaseless confronta-
tion and negotiation with one's own historical alterity of dis-
ruption and discontinuities. We must realize, as J u d i t h Butler 
conjoins, that "the claim of universality will no longer be separ-
able from the antagonism by which it is continually contested": 
"recognition will no longer be a matter of finding oneself in 
the Other but precisely a matter of not finding oneself i n the 
O t h e r — t h e preservation of a difference recognition cannot 
overcome" (6). 
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